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Contributing to the lively  debate on closed leagues (North American model) versus 
open leagues (European model) in professional sport league, this paper aims at determining 
the drivers of promotion and relegation in the major European soccer leagues. Using a large 
and  original  dataset  (for  example:  club’s  link  with  a  billionaire,  club  listed  in  the  stock 
market, etc.) and logistic regressions, our results show that institutional factors matter to settle 
in the elite. It also indicates that open leagues system in European soccer championships is de 
facto very similar to closed leagues system. Furthermore, our forecasting model can be of 
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1.  Introduction 
 
European soccer leagues are one of the most popular sportive organizations in the 
world.  One  of  their  major  originality  in  comparison  with  American  sport  leagues  (see 
Andreff, 2006, for an exhaustive comparison) is that the membership is not fixed over time: 
sportive  performances  during  the  season  determine  whether  a  club  shall  be  promoted  in 
superior division or relegated to inferior division. Noll (2002), Ross and Szymanski (2002) 
and Szymanski (2006) detail how this format was put in place at the creation of English 
football league in 1888
1. This format was expanded to other European soccer leagues and still 
remains
2. However, debates occured in the sport press and soccer institutions, for years. On 
one hand, some support the North-American model where leagues are closed and members 
are the same season after season and, on the other hand, there are supporters of the European 
model with open leagues based on promotion and relegation sys tem. This debate also takes 
place  on  a  European  scale:  Hoehn and Szymanski (1999)  propose the architecture  of  a 
European Superleague.  
 
The structure of professional  soccer leagues has already been studied, especially its 
financial  impact  (Noll,  2002,  Szym anski  and  Valetti,  2005).   Noll  (2002)  explores  the 
economic impact of the promotion and relegation system in professional sport leagues in 
general: he argues promotion and relegation system tends to spread teams’ quality in the 
higher division of a league. This would arise from the profit incentives balance created by 
such a system. Indeed, in a closed league, incentives are not affected by the fact that the 
weakest teams will be relegated, which results in reducing the gap between top and bottom 
teams. On the contrary, opportunity of promotion (and of getting related profits), and fear of 
relegation, will encourage teams to improve their own quality. Szymanski and Valetti (2005) 
further  show  that  promotion  and  relegation  system  enhances  sportive  effort  incentives 
(avoiding  relegation  strongly  exacerbates  the  competition  between  bottom  teams)  but 
diminishes the incentive to share incomes: top teams would tend to invest so as to maintain a 
higher level,  widening the gap with  bottom  teams.  Both  Noll  (2002) and  Szymanski  and 
Valletti (2005) bring empirical support to their theoretical model by taking the example of the 
English football League. However, they only focus on the economic impact of the promotion 
                                                            
1 A second division was set in 1893 and the system of promotion of the best teams of the second division and 
relegation of the worst of the first division was set in 1898. 
2 The promotion and relegation system remained in Europe, even if many rules changes occurred in practice.  
Noll (2002) details these changes in the case of the English league since its creation.    3 
and  relegation  system  and  to  our  knowledge,  and  as  noticed  by  Matheson  (2006)  in  his 
literature  review  on  European  soccer  and  by  Szymanski  (2006),  there  has  been  no  work 
focusing  on  the  determinants  of  the  teams’  promotion  and  relegation.  This  is  striking 
considering the stakes linked with promotion and relegation. Indeed, beside sport betting or 
fans’ disappointment, sportive relegation is often a financial drama: the club has to sell its 
best players, it loses revenues from sponsors and broadcasting rights, it might have to fire 
staff members, etc. Thus, the possibility to forecast promotion and relegation could help to 
make economic decisions.  Noll  (2002) documents  well the concentration of top  teams  in 
English Premier League, giving the intuition that elite teams are more likely to stay in the elite 
the season after. However, a wide range of statistics remains unused in the study of promotion 
and relegation. Though, it is interesting to understand whether cultural and economical factors 
play a role in the location of elite soccer teams: for example, Kuper and Szymanski (2009) 
relate soccer clubs location in Europe to the industrial revolution.  
 
  This  paper  aims  at  filling  the  gap,  taking  the  particular  cases  of  the  five  major 
European soccer leagues (England, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain); the promotion and 
relegation system being almost the same among these five championships. Our main objective 
is to propose a model able to forecast promotion for second division clubs and relegation for 
first division clubs. As relegation for a football club can be considered similar in the sportive 
sphere to a bond default in the financial sphere, we employ logistic regressions in the same 
way  than  papers  studying  sovereign  bond  defaults  (for  example  Catao  and  Sutton,  2002, 
Manasse et al., 2003). Indeed, logistic regressions aim at explaining binary variables. In the 
vein of Manasse et al. (2003), we propose an early warning system to detect, before the 
beginning  of  the  sportive  season,  clubs  for  which  the  probability  of  relegation  is  high. 
Besides, due to the lack of previous studies on this topic, this investigation is exploratory and 
not restrictive concerning the explanatory variables’ choice.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we present the data we use in the study. In 
Section 3, we report the results of the promotion/relegation empirical determinants’ analysis 
for the major European football leagues. Section 4 proposes an out-of-sample forecast of 
promotion and relegation for the 2008/2009 season. Section 5 concludes. 
  
 




We focus on the five most important European soccer leagues
3 according to the Union of 
European Football Associations (UEFA) ranking in 2009, that is to say England, France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain. The study is restricted to the sportive seasons from 2004/2005 to 
2008/2009 because the leagues’ size and promotion/relegation  rules were different during  
previous seasons. The system of relegation is the same among these five leagues: the three 
teams at the bottom of the first division are relegated to the second division. The promotion 
system is also very similar: in France, Germany and Spain, the three first teams of the second 
division are promoted in the first division while in England and Italy, the two first teams are 
directly promoted and the third team promoted is the winner of play-offs involving the third to 
the sixth teams of the second division. There is a particularity in  Italy: play-offs may be 
avoided if the third ranked club of the second division has 10 points more than the fourth 
ranked club and if so, is promoted
4. The size of the first divisions ranges from 18 to 20 and 
the size of the second divisions ranges from 18 to 24, that makes possible the comparison 
across the leagues. Final league tables are downloaded from the websites of the different 
national  leagues.  This  study  only  takes  into  account   promotion  and  relegation  through 
sportive results: for this reason, we do as if  FC Messina Peloro was relegated for the season 
2005/2006 in Italy instead of Juventus FC which was  administratively relegated because of a 
match fixing scandal.  
 
Considering the sample itself, we notice a kind of yo-yo effect, already noticed by Noll (2002) 
with eleven clubs (Birmingham City FC, SM Caen, MSV Duisburg, US Lecce, Levante UD, 
FC Metz, FC Nantes,  CD Numancia, FC Hansa Rostock, RC Strasbourg, West Bromwitch 
Albion FC) relegated twice from the first division during the five seasons of the study and 
four clubs promoted twice (Birmingham City FC, MSV Duisburg, FC Köln, Sunderland 
AFC). The two most representative clubs of this phen omenon are Birmingham City FC and 
MSV Duisburg with two relegations and two promotions in five years.  
                                                            
3 The Deloitte Football Money League report (2007) and the Financial Action Task Force (2009) also identify 
these five leagues as the five  “big ones”. The Deloitte Football Money League (2007) reports that the overall 
revenues for the top tier clubs of these five leagues represent € 5.2 billions.  
4 On the five study seasons, play-offs were avoided only in the season 2006/2007 where the third club had ten 
points more than his direct follower, Piacenza Calcio. But the promoted club was always th e third ranked club, 
except in 2004/2005 where Ascoli Calcio, sixth-ranked, won the play-offs.    5 
 
The main issue in soccer-related studies is the lack of homogeneous data on football clubs. 
Studying promotion and relegation requires data for each club involved in the first or second 
division for each league and for each season. It includes 259 distinct European football clubs: 
55 in England, 47 in France, 48 in Germany, 55 in Italy and 54 in Spain. However, due to a 
lack of data availability, financial variables like total sales, players’ wages or revenues from 
transfers cannot be used here: some reports like the yearly Deloitte Football Money League or 
the Forbes Most Valuable Soccer Teams
5 provide detailed financial data on top European 
soccer teams. However, to our knowledge, there is no such database or data source for alle the 
European clubs in the two first divisions in Europe - it is by the way surprising that the 
Deloitte and Forbes data are so little used in the literature
6-. It is obvious that financial data 
would have a strong impact on the sportive results of the clubs: a rich club can hire good 
players and consequently makes its relegation probability lower and promotion probability 
higher. But working on a large group of clubs, as it is nee ded for our study, unfortunately 
implied to do without such a variable. Three types of variables are considered here: variables 
concerning the players and the staff, variables concerning institutional factors related to the 
clubs and variables concerning t he economic context of the region in which the clubs are 
located.  
 
The list of our potential explanatory variables includes:  
  the team’s average age (Source:  http://www.eufo.de/). 
  the percentage of foreign players (Source: http://www.eufo.de/). 
  the club seniority in the division. 
  the coach seniority in the club at the beginning of the season (Source: authors’s 
calculation). 
  the participation to an European competition (Source: UEFA). 
  the fact that the club has ever won the national cup or the championship since 
1980
7.  
  the financial link with a billionaire
8 (Source: http://www.forbes.com) 
                                                            
5 Deloitte publishes each year a report  with detailed financial data  on the 20 more lucrative European soccer 
clubs. Forbes also publishes each year a report on the 25 “most valuable soccer teams” with detailed statistics.   
6 The data could be used to test structural models about top European soccer. 
7  1980 being the date we retain for the beginning of our football era with the important increase of TV 
broadcasting rights. 
8 As businessmen and billionaires in particular are more and more involved in European soccer, we built a 
billionaire dummy with the help of the magazine Forbes, the common reference for billionaires. To do so, we   6 
  club listed on the stock market.  
  the presence of a club of the same city in first division. 
  the stadium capacity (Source: clubs’ websites). 
  the club creation date (Source: clubs’ websites). 
  the city population (Source: http://www.wikipedia.org/ 
9). 
  the GDP per capita of the region in which the club is located (Source: Eurostat). 
  the 5  years average of GDP growth  of the region in  which the club is located 
(Source: OECD). 
  the population density of the region in which the club is located (Source: Eurostat). 
  the  percentage  of  agriculture  and  industry  in  the  total  employment  (Source: 
OECD).  
  the unemployment rate of the region in which the club is located (Source: Eurostat). 
  the percentage of the labour force with secondary and tertiary education (Source: 
OECD). 
  
Descriptive statistics for these variables are in the Table 1 in Appendix for the season 
2008/2009. They already give interesting insights. For several variables, there is a strong 
distinction between first and second division clubs: the percentage of foreign players, the 
average coach seniority in the club, the stadium capacity, the city population, the percentage 
of service in total employment in the region and the population density in the region are 
higher  in  first  division  clubs  than  in  second  division  ones.  Then,  we  notice  some 
heterogeneity across the different leagues: for example, the percentage of foreign players and 
the stadium capacity are much more important in England and Germany than in France, Italy 
and Spain. On average, English and German clubs have also been created before French, 
Italian and Spanish ones. 
 
In  order  to  maximize  the  sample  size,  we  focus  on  pooled  regressions  for  the  five 
countries. To do so, we run two panel logistic
10 regressions, one for promotion and the other 
for relegation, because this model aims at explaining binary variables . In the first (resp. 
second) one,  we consider  variables of  first division (resp. second division) clubs and  the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
collected all the soccer-related news on http://www.forbes.com and we attribute 1 when mention is made of a 
financial link between a soccer club and a billionaire and 0 otherwise.  
9 Wikipedia proposes the latest data from the national offices of statistics in almost every case. 
10 Probit regressions have also been tried with very similar results.    7 
dependent variable is a dummy being 1 when the club is relegated (resp. promoted) and 0 
otherwise. In order to remove biases between distinct leagues and seasons, we take reduced 
centered figures related to the teams from the same league and season. As many variables 
appear  to  be  correlated,  we  adopt  a  “backward  elimination”  procedure  with  a  retention 
threshold of 0,30.  
 
3. Results 
In Table  2 (respectively Table  3), the logit  regression results  are available for relegation 
(respectively  promotion)  in  the  European  football  leagues  for  the  seasons  2004/2005  to 
2008/2009.  
Table 2 Logit regression results for relegation in European football leagues 2004/2005 to 
2008/2009 
Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.  
Average of players' age 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.22
% of foreign players -0.08 0.64
Years of presence in first division  -0.56 0.07 -0.54 0.06
Years of presence of the current coach -0.21 0.26
Link with a billionaire -0.46 0.13 -0.46 0.12
Won something since 1980 -0.14 0.50
Stadium capacity -0.27 0.38 -0.37 0.12
Year of the club's creation -0.01 0.93
Club is qualified for Europe for the season to come -0.40 0.08 -0.48 0.03
Club listed on the stock market 0.33 0.15 0.34 0.14
Another club of the same city in first division 0.13 0.66
City population -0.26 0.56
Region: population density  0.49 0.11 0.45 0.10
Region: GDP per capita 0.08 0.83
Region: GDP growth -0.16 0.39
Region: % Agriculture in Total Employment 0.52 0.02 0.52 0.01
Region: % Industry in Total Employment 0.57 0.02 0.68 0.00
Region: % of the labour force with secondary education -0.39 0.07 -0.33 0.06
Region: % of the labour force with tertiary education -0.24 0.31 -0.28 0.15
Region: % of unemployment -0.06 0.79
McFadden R-squared 19.37% 18.65%
Observations 490 490







   8 
Table 3  Logit regression results for promotion in European football leagues 2004/2005 to 
2008/2009 
Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.  
Average of players' age 0.13 0.38
% of foreign players -0.01 0.94
Years of presence in second division (from 1st division) -0.64 0.05 -0.47 0.03
Years of presence in second division (from 3rd division) 0.12 0.53
Years of presence of the current coach -0.21 0.25 -0.21 0.22
Link with a billionaire 2.98 0.05 2.96 0.05
Won something since 1980 0.07 0.64
Stadium capacity 0.62 0.00 0.58 0.00
Year of the club's creation 0.04 0.80
Club listed on the stock market 0.27 0.25 0.31 0.15
Another club of the same city in first division -0.35 0.14 -0.43 0.06
City population 0.29 0.15 0.30 0.12
Region: population density  0.06 0.78
Region: GDP per capita -0.18 0.48
Region: GDP growth -0.33 0.05 -0.31 0.06
Region: % Agriculture in Total Employment -0.25 0.21 -0.21 0.15
Region: % Industry in Total Employment 0.22 0.25 0.20 0.27
Region: % of the labour force with secondary education -0.16 0.31
Region: % of the labour force with tertiary education 0.00 0.98
Region: % of unemployment 0.14 0.49 0.28 0.09
McFadden R-squared 14.19% 13.54%
Observations 530 530






   First, the pseudo R² after the “backward elimination” procedure is pretty low for both 
regressions (0.19 for the relegation regression and 0.13 for the promotion regression). By 
order of comparison, the same regression is run with a dependent variable being 1 if the club 
is champion at the end of the season and 0 otherwise, and obtains a pseudo R² equal to 0.45 
(see Table 4 in Appendix). An explanation could be that forecasting top teams’ results is 
easier than bottom teams’ ones but also mainly that there is a strong heterogeneity between 
the five different leagues. Despite this quite low predictive power, some interesting insights 
emerge.  After  the  “backward  elimination”  procedure,  several  regional  variables  remain 
significant. This indicates clearly that the regional context matters in the location of elite 
soccer teams.  
 
  Concerning the relegation from the first division (see Table 2), the regional context 
plays a highly significant role: it appears that the more the percentage of services in the total   9 
employment  and  also  the  more  the  percentage  of  educated  regional  people,  the  less  the 
relegation probability. Noticing that almost all the best football clubs in Europe are located in 
industrial cities (Manchester or Milan for example), Kuper and Szymanski (2009) describe the 
role of the industrial revolution in the location of soccer clubs in Europe: at this period, soccer 
was  a  way  for  newcomers  in  industrial  towns  to  socialize.  We  interpret  the  significant 
negative impact of the industry variable on relegation by the decline of industries in Europe in 
relation  with  the  globalization,  this  would  explain  the  decline  in  the  elite  of  clubs  from 
industrial regions, for example Strasbourg and Birmingham in our sample, compared to clubs 
of services areas.  
 
  It  sounds  obvious  that  the  seniority  in  the  first  division  and  the  qualification  in 
European Cup decrease significantly the relegation probability. Indeed, clubs in first division 
have had access to first division broadcastings rights for several years, important matchday 
revenues and had the time to build high level teams. Moreover, clubs qualified in European 
Competition must have had very good players the former season to qualify. The stadium 
capacity variable, even if less significant, goes in the same way: this can be interpreted by the 
fact that having a big stadium allows you to receive important matchday revenues and in some 
cases stadium naming revenues
11. It can also ease access to credit.  Actually, these variables 
are  the  illustration  of  elite  reproduction  and  fully  validate  the  theoretical  findings  of 
Szymanski and Valetti (2005): incomes are little shared in the soccer elite and a hard core of a 
bit more than 10 clubs is durably set in each league.  The process is self-reinforcing because 
belonging to  the elite for years makes the club earn more money and allows  hiring good 
players, what diminishes the relegation probability. 
 
  Concerning the promotion regression (Table  3), the most significant variable is the 
stadium capacity. Again, having a big stadium allows clubs to obtain important revenues and 
induces a strong relative difference between second division clubs. This could encourage the 
return in the elite of top clubs “accidentally” demoted, that is to say demoted while they had 
the  financial  and  sportive  means  to  stay  in  the  first  division.  Besides,  the  impact  of  the 
seniority in second division is asymmetric, depending on the origin (first or third division): it 
is only significant for clubs coming from the first division (p-value=0.03). As suggested by 
                                                            
11 The most famous example is Arsenal FC: the club concluded a 15 years naming deal for its new stadium with 
Emirates airlines for more than GBP 100 millions.    10 
Hoehn  and  Szymanski  (1999),  demoted  clubs  from  first  division  are  more  likely  to  be 
promoted the years following the relegation. After what, they get bogged down in second 
division, a priori because they progressively lose first division financial means. This is related 
to the yo-yo effect underlined by Noll (2002).  
 
  Another interesting point is that presence of another team of the same city in first 
division significantly (p=0.06) decreases the promotion probability, indicating that Barcelona, 
Liverpool, London, Manchester, Milan or Madrid would stay exceptions in European soccer. 
Like Kuper and Szymanski (2009), we interpret this by the fact that the majority of resources 
in terms of attendance and matchday revenues already belongs to the principal football club of 
the city and is unable to develop durably. 
 
  The  significance  of  the  growth  and  unemployment  variables  in  the  promotion 
regression is striking: clubs of regions with high growth and low unemployment, that is to say 
in  good  economic  shape,  are  less  likely  to  be  promoted.  We  do  not  have  credible 
interpretations for this. Regions in bad economic shape could desire a football club in the elite 
in order to develop social and entertainment activities for people in economic distress. For 
cities, it is also a matter of prestige to have a successful football club and it can improve or 
even build the media-related image of the city. But this interpretation stands also for regions 
in good economic shape. 
 
  Both  “Billionaire”  and  “Stock  Market”  variables  remain  after  the  “backward 
elimination”  procedure  in  both  regressions  but  their  significance  strongly  differs.  The 
“Billionaire” dummy increases significantly (p-value=0.05) the promotion probability. This is 
not surprising if one considers the huge amounts of money invested by billionaires in soccer, 
what tends globally to increase the team’s level. Nevertheless, we have to admit that this 
dummy  could  be  improved  by  also  considering  multimillionaires  and  non  billionaires 
tycoons
12 but we are not aware of such data sources. An astonishing point is the influence of 
the stock market dummy: it is significant neither for promotion nor for relegation but the sign 
is the same.  
                                                            
12 For example, Mohamed Al Fayed invested in Fulham F.C. in 1997 while the club was in the third division 
(currently called Football League One) and made the club go in Premier League but he is not considered as 
billionaire by Forbes.   11 
  In both regressions, indicators concerning the teams’ average age and the percentage 
of foreign players fail to be significant at conventional levels. For these two variables, several 
contradictory phenomena play a role. For example, very young talents can improve the staff 
quality  but  this  argument  holds  also  for  confirmed  thirty-year-old  players.  For  the  same 
reasons, the percentage of foreign players has no significant impact here on promotion and 
relegation:  the  percentage  of  foreign  players  can  be  an  indicator  of  teams’  quality  (for 
example, Liverpool, Chelsea, Arsenal and Internazionale Milano have around 80% of foreign 
players) but a perfect counterexample is the Athletic Bilbao that has only Basque players and 
that is the only Spanish club together with Real Madrid and FC Barcelona to have always 
been member of the first division.  
 
4. Out-of-sample forecast for the season 2008/2009 
   
  In this section, we discuss the practical accuracy of our model by running an out-of-
sample forecast of promotion and relegation for the season 2008/2009. We run both logistic 
regressions with data from 2004/2005 to 2007/2008 and compute promotion and relegation 
probabilities by applying to this model clubs’ characteristics known at the beginning of the 
season 2008/2009. The forecasted probability of relegation (resp. promotion) is presented in 
Table 5 (resp. Table 6) for each club with the final rank at the end of the season 2008/2009. 


























Stoke 0.57 12 Valenciennes 0.38 12 Karlsruher 0.74 17 Atalanta 0.46 11 Numancia 0.52 19
West Brom 0.49 20 Grenoble 0.37 13 Bochum 0.30 14 Chievo 0.45 16 Osasuna 0.39 15
Hull 0.36 17 Sochaux 0.32 14 Bielefeld 0.26 18 Lecce 0.39 20 Malaga 0.31 8
Wigan 0.27 11 Caen 0.32 18 Cottbus 0.26 16 Catania 0.26 15 Valladolid 0.28 16
Bolton 0.24 13 Le Havre 0.29 20 Hannover 0.22 11 Bologna 0.25 17 Almeria 0.24 11
Fulham 0.21 7 Le Mans 0.27 16 Moenchengladbach 0.19 15 Siena 0.19 14 Huelva 0.24 20
Portsmouth 0.19 14 Nantes 0.20 19 Köln 0.18 12 Juventus 0.17 2 Villarreal 0.23 5
Blackburn 0.18 15 Lorient 0.18 10 Leverkusen 0.17 9 Reggina 0.17 19 Gijon 0.13 14
Middlesbrough 0.16 19 Lille 0.18 5 Wolfsburg 0.13 1 Cagliari 0.14 9 Valencia 0.12 6
Sunderland 0.10 16 Lyon 0.11 3 Stuttgart 0.13 3 Palermo 0.13 8 Betis 0.12 18
West Ham 0.06 9 Auxerre 0.10 8 Frankfurt 0.09 13 Torino 0.10 18 Getafe 0.08 17
Aston Villa 0.05 6 Nancy 0.09 15 Dortmund 0.08 6 Napoli 0.10 12 Sevilla 0.07 3
Everton 0.03 5 Nice 0.06 9 Hoffenheim 0.07 7 Genoa 0.05 5 Espanyol 0.07 10
Tottenham 0.03 8 Toulouse 0.04 4 Bayern 0.06 2 Fiorentina 0.05 4 Santander 0.06 12
Newcastle 0.01 18 St. Etienne 0.03 17 Bremen 0.06 10 Inter 0.03 1 Ath. Bilbao 0.06 13
Manchester City 0.01 10 Bordeaux 0.02 1 Schalke 0.03 8 Udinese 0.02 7 Mallorca 0.04 9
Chelsea 0.01 3 Monaco 0.02 11 Hertha 0.02 4 Sampdoria 0.02 13 La Coruna 0.02 7
Liverpool 0.01 2 PSG 0.01 6 Hamburger 0.01 5 Lazio 0.02 10 Atl. Madrid 0.01 4
Arsenal 0.00 4 Rennes 0.00 7 AS Roma 0.00 6 Barcelona 0.00 1
Manchester Utd 0.00 1 Marseille 0.00 2 AC Milan 0.00 3 Real Madrid 0.00 2
Spain England France Germany Italy
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Birmingham 0.55 2 Lens 0.64 1 Duisburg 0.41 6 Parma 0.41 2 Zaragoza 0.35 2
Sheffield Utd 0.41 3 Strasbourg 0.50 4 Rostock 0.35 13 Bari 0.28 1 Elche 0.26 12
Derby 0.27 18 Metz 0.41 5 Kaiserslautern 0.28 7 Livorno 0.22 3 Celta Vigo 0.25 17
Sheffield Wed 0.26 12 Sedan 0.21 9 Frankfurt 0.26 15 Empoli 0.21 5 Real Sociedad 0.24 6
Coventry 0.19 17 Amiens 0.21 18 Oberhausen 0.23 9 Avellino 0.17 21 Alicante 0.23 20
Southampton 0.19 23 Troyes 0.20 19 Aachen 0.21 4 Triestina 0.16 8 Hercules 0.22 4
Wolves 0.17 1 Montpellier 0.11 2 Mainz 0.17 2 Ascoli 0.16 16 Sevilla Atl. 0.20 22
Preston 0.16 6 Reims 0.10 20 Nurnberg 0.15 3 Salernitana 0.15 14 Levante 0.19 8
Burnley 0.11 5 Tours 0.09 6 Munich 1860 0.14 12 Modena 0.14 15 Murcia 0.16 14
Barnsley 0.10 20 Nimes 0.09 17 St. Pauli 0.14 8 Mantova 0.14 13 Castellon 0.11 7
Charlton 0.09 24 Dijon 0.08 8 Wehen 0.11 18 Albinoleffe 0.14 9 Alaves 0.10 19
Crystal Palace 0.06 15 Clermont 0.06 12 Freiburg 0.11 1 Rimini 0.12 18 Gimnastic 0.10 10
Norwich 0.06 22 Angers 0.06 7 Ahlen 0.10 10 Pisa 0.12 20 Salamanca 0.10 9
Watford 0.06 13 Boulogne 0.06 3 Koblenz 0.10 14 Piacenza 0.11 10 Xerez 0.09 1
Swansea 0.05 8 Guingamp 0.04 13 Augsburg 0.09 11 Treviso 0.09 22 Eibar 0.07 21
QPR 0.04 11 Ajaccio 0.04 16 Furth 0.07 5 Sassuolo 0.09 7 Cordoba 0.06 13
Doncaster 0.04 14 Brest 0.04 14 Osnabruck 0.06 16 Grosseto 0.08 6 Huesca 0.06 11
Plymouth 0.04 21 Chateauroux 0.03 15 Ingolstadt 0.02 17 Brescia 0.07 4 Albacete 0.05 15
Nottingham 0.03 19 Bastia 0.02 11 Ancona 0.05 19 Girona 0.05 16
Cardiff 0.03 7 Vannes 0.01 10 Cittadella 0.04 17 Tenerife 0.04 3
Ipswich 0.03 9 Frosinone 0.03 11 Las Palmas 0.04 18
Reading 0.03 4 Vicenza 0.02 12 Vallecano 0.03 5
Blackpool 0.02 16
Bristol City 0.02 10
Spain England France Germany Italy
 
 First, if we retain a threshold probability of 0.20 as early signal of promotion and 
relegation, the model predicts well 10 clubs out of 15 for the relegation and 6 out of 15 for the 
promotion. In the other way, the model predicts wrongly 19 relegations and 21 promotions. 
The model forecasts better relegation than promotion, which has to be related with the better 
pseudo R² of the relegation regression. However, promotion and relegation appear to be not 
fully predictable by our variables, which is not a surprise given the low predictive power of 
the regressions shown in Section 3. Two main reasons can be invoked: the lack of financial 
data and the leagues’ heterogeneity. Nevertheless, it gives interesting guidelines for further 
developments of the model.  
 
In each country, there is a hard core from 8 clubs in Germany to 11 clubs in England 
in the first division for which the relegation probability is very low (below 0.10). These clubs 
are also the best ranked at the end of the season 2008/2009. This is linked with findings of 
Section 3: these groups of top clubs are durably set in the first division and attract financial 
resources in order to stay in the elite. From these hard cores, only Newcastle was relegated in 
2008/2009. This can be considered as an “accident” but one can also assume that the seniority 
in first division
13 can increase the relegation probability if the club does not win  any trophy 
because it has not access to top clubs revenues (from European championship for example).     
 
Concerning the promotion, results are more dispersive.  Forecasts are good in the 
Italian case with the three clubs promoted (Parma, Bari and Livorno) having the highest 
promotion probability at the beginning of the season. Except in Germany, the clubs with the 
highest promotion probability have been promoted (Birmingham FC, RC Lens, Parma and 
Zaragoza). However, forecasts are clearly inaccurate in Germany with no promoted club in 
the six clubs with the highest promotion probability.  
  
Some cases are very difficult to forecast. A very good example is Boulogne-sur-Mer  
in France. This club from Nord-Pas-de-Calais was promoted  to Ligue 1 at the end of the 
season 2008/2009 while its promotion probability  was very low (0.06). Explanations of this 
exploit are very scarce. First, Boulogne-sur-Mer club is not rich at all: when it was promoted 
from National (the third division) to Ligue 2 at the end of the season 2006/2007, the Direction 
Nationale du Contrôle de Gestion (DNCG), the French watchdog  of football clubs almost 
forbade the promotion because of insufficient financial resources. Second, the experience of   15 
the players was not exceptional: two years before the promotion in Ligue 1, the club was in 
the third division and one year before, they had to struggle until the lat game to stay in Ligue 
2. Third, the stadium “Stade de la Libération” could accommodate around 8000 spectators at 
that time, what was few even for a French second division club. Fourth, the coach had not any 
record
14. Fifth, Boulogne-sur-Mer had never been in the elite before while there was already 
three clubs in the region  Nord-Pas-de-Calais
15 established in the first or second division for 
many years. In the case of Boulogne-sur-Mer, the most plausible explanation is the system of 
play quality put in place and the collective power of the players.  Typically, this promotion 
will offer the “David and Goliath contests” mentioned in Hoehn and Szymanski (1999). 
 
  The structure of promotion and relegation leagues lets us think that in the second 
leagues, except clubs benefiting from exceptional institutional advantages (billionaire on the 





The  aim  of  this  paper  was  to  study  the  empirical  determinants  of  promotion  and 
relegation in the major European soccer leagues. Even if our approach is exploratory, we 
believe that it yields insights complementing the works of Noll (2002) and Szymanski and 
Valletti (2005).  
 
In European soccer leagues, a hard core of clubs in the first divisions appears to be 
very  unlikely  to  be  demoted  to  the  lower  division.  The  present  study  shows  that  this 
phenomenon  is  self-reinforcing.  There  is  a  kind  of  top-league  inside  the  first  league: 
institutional  factors  like  the  stadium  capacity,  the  club  background,  and  the  link  with 
businessmen contribute to clubs’ successfulness. This has for consequence that these clubs are 
able to compete at the highest level over seasons. Moreover, if one of these top clubs happens 
to be relegated “accidentally” in the second league, the return in first division the next season 
is very likely. For these clubs, it results in a yo-yo effect because the club’s competitiveness is 
not high enough to remain in first division but institutional factors support their return in first 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
13 Newcastle had been in the Premier League since the season 1993/1994. 
14 Before being Boulogne-sur-Mer coach, Philippe Montanier had just been the assistant of Robert Nouzaret 
when he was in charge of Côte d’Ivoire.    16 
division.  By  contrast,  the  other  clubs  have  strong  difficulties  in  establishing  themselves 
durably in the first division. To put it in a nutshell, the promotion and relegation system of 
European football leagues does not correspond to a real open league in which there would be 
a lot of renewals but rather already looks like closed leagues completed with four or five 
rotating clubs.  
 
Further research could focus on the reasons why some top clubs established for many 
years in the first division are sometimes demoted, a possible reason being governance issues. 
On the contrary, it could be interesting to study the determinants of success stories where 
clubs originally playing in the third or fourth division succeed in reaching quickly the elite: 
subsidies, coach personality, staff stability, etc. We also believe that the drivers of promotion 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the season 2008/2009 
1st div. 2nd div. 1st div. 2nd div. 1st div. 2nd div. 1st div. 2nd div. 1st div. 2nd div.
Average of players' age 26.0 25.7 25.6 25.6 25.6 25.9 26.7 26.4 26.8 26.8
(1.5) (1) (1.4) (1.2) (1.1) (1) (1.3) (1.2) (0.7) (1.6)
% of foreign players 61.54% 46.53% 39.18% 27.23% 55.53% 35.99% 38.80% 21.14% 37.70% 16.86%
(13.32%) (14.22%) (11.54%) (12.49%) (8.43%) (13.89%) (13.44%) (9.05%) (18.87%) (10.74%)
Years of presence of the current coach 3.1 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.6 0.9 1.5 0.4 0.9 0.5
(5.3) (1.2) (1.7) (1.6) (2.2) (1.2) (1.8) (0.6) (1.1) (0.9)
Stadium Capacity 38506 25386 26940 17195 44852 27451 47412 19672 37175 22689
(13981) (6631) (13053) (9334) (20043) (16319) (22435) (11541) (23346) (11094)
Creation date 1886 1885 1916 1921 1911 1912 1912 1918 1920 1928
(15) (12) (22) (28) (23) (27) (16) (18) (28) (18)
City Population 2113106 1179251 353590 114592 686088 392579 709041 109725 768974 324451
(3230911) (2470605) (552551) (77450) (817291) (457876) (795428) (74468) (950018) (235462)
Region: population density 3416 1836 174 107 778 498 240 249 214 184
(3525) (2948) (196) (85) (931) (515) (102) (103) (228) (150)
Region: GDP per capita 38310 31988 24200 22020 29939 30389 24358 26864 24905 24314
(24414) (18754) (4140) (1360) (6810) (7312) (5970) (4986) (5058) (4568)
Region: % Agriculture in Total Employment 0.80% 1.38% 3.88% 4.94% 1.76% 2.20% 4.63% 3.42% 4.82% 4.88%
(0.45%) (0.69%) (2%) (1.66%) (0.96%) (0.89%) (3.27%) (1.54%) (3.17%) (3.22%)
Region: % Industry in Total Employment 19.22% 20.55% 23.26% 23.56% 24.61% 25.36% 25.63% 31.65% 28.81% 30.47%
(5.14%) (4.47%) (4.25%) (3.66%) (5.16%) (4.09%) (7.31%) (5.89%) (4.94%) (4.79%)
Region: % of the labour force with Secondary Education 45.21% 45.22% 45.98% 44.53% 56.80% 57.69% 44.20% 44.44% 22.61% 22.52%
(2.82%) (2.07%) (3.65%) (7.26%) (3.44%) (1.91%) (4.37%) (3.16%) (2.35%) (2.13%)
Region: % of the labour force with Tertiary Education 29.95% 28.91% 25.40% 22.94% 24.08% 23.51% 14.59% 14.51% 32.07% 31.63%
(5.52%) (4.36%) (4.43%) (4.01%) (3.65%) (1.82%) (2.15%) (1.34%) (6.42%) (7.2%)
Region: % of unemployment 6.88% 5.95% 7.82% 8.48% 8.52% 7.16% 6.59% 4.71% 8.39% 8.24%
(1.43%) (1.54%) (1.67%) (2.06%) (2.94%) (2.93%) (3.65%) (2.76%) (2.79%) (2.37%)
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Table 4 Logit regression results for the championship winner in European football leagues 
2004/2005 to 2008/2009 
Average of players' age -0.18 0.62
% of foreign players 0.24 0.52 0.44 0.14
Years of presence in first division  0.17 0.66
Years of presence of the current coach -0.61 0.08 -0.66 0.02
Link with a billionaire -0.22 0.50
Won something since 1980 -0.07 0.90
Stadium capacity 1.90 0.00 2.02 0.00
Year of the club's creation 0.13 0.79
Club is qualified for Europe for the season to come 1.23 0.01 1.16 0.01
Club listed on the stock market -0.28 0.37
Another club of the same city in first division 0.29 0.65
City population -1.16 0.13 -1.49 0.01
Region: population density  0.05 0.94
Region: GDP per capita 0.62 0.36 0.83 0.06
Region: GDP growth 0.53 0.34 0.57 0.17
Region: % Agriculture in Total Employment 0.11 0.87
Region: % Industry in Total Employment 0.17 0.75
Region: % of the labour force with secondary education -0.22 0.70
Region: % of the labour force with tertiary education -0.18 0.79
McFadden R-squared 46.88% 45.22%
Observations 490 490






Regional  variables  matter  less  than  for  the  promotion  and  relegation  regressions.  Top 
teams managed to abstract themselves of the regional context and their performances are more 
driven by specific variables. Besides, contrary to the promotion and relegation regressions, 
the percentage of foreign players matters here: the capacity to attract international players 
helps to win the championship. 
 
A  very  interesting  point  is  that  the  probability  to  be  champion  decreases  with  the 
population of the city. Actually, this finding has to be related to the previous findings of 
Kuper and Szymanski (2009) who explain that the major clubs are not located in capital cities, 
these latter having the biggest population. They notice for example that no London club has 
ever won a European cup. 
 